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Mixed signals: Why investors may misjudge first-time high technology venture founders  
  
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper seeks to explain an unexpected result of a previous quantitative study which 
suggested sub-optimal evaluation by investors of the human capital of first time high tech 
venture founders.  A literature review revealed two possible reasons for this finding: 
biases/heuristics and signaling. Six investors across three countries (one venture capitalist and 
one business angel each from the US, UK and Israel) with experience in investing in early 
stage high technology ventures were interviewed using an identical semi-structured interview 
protocol. This research design is appropriate for research that seeks to reflect back unexpected 
findings of previous quantitative research on the subjects of research. Interviewees were first 
asked to state their own investment criteria, and then presented with the results of the 
quantitative study and asked for their views. Previous research suggesting a gap between in-
use and espoused criteria, and extensive use of gut feeling in decision-making, was supported. 
Interviewees focused on harvest potential and de-emphasised measures of founder technology 
capability that predicted early survival and growth in the earlier study. The paper concludes 
by suggesting how investors might improve funding decisions in high tech ventures led by 
first-time entrepreneurs, noting the study’s limitations and making recommendations for 
further research.  
 
Keywords: investor decision-making, biases and heuristics, signaling, human capital, first-
time founders, high technology ventures 
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 Introduction 
 
The subject of this paper is how investors in early stage high tech ventures make investment 
decisions, with special emphasis on why investors may misread the technology capability of 
first-time venture founders. The subject of what criteria venture capitalists (VCs) use in 
investment decision-making has been extensively studied for decades (Wells 1974; 
Poindexter 1976; Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; MacMillan, Siegel, and Subbanarasimha 1985; 
MacMillan, Zemann, and Subbanarasimha 1987; Bygrave and Timmons 1992; Fried and 
Hisrich 1994; Wright, Robbie, and Ennew 1997; Zacharakis and Meyer 1998; Zacharakis and 
Shepherd 2005; Zacharakis, McMullen, and Shepherd 2007). Studies have also been 
conducted on the investment criteria of business angels, another major category of equity 
investor in new firms, though not as extensively or for as long (Wetzel 1981; Haar, Starr, and 
MacMillan 1988; Mason and Harrison 1996; van Osnabrugge 1998; Feeney, Haines, and 
Riding 1999; Mason and Stark 2004; Sudek 2007). In this paper, we seek to explain a 
puzzling finding in a quantitative study of investment by VCs and business angels in early 
stage high technology-based firms founded by first-time entrepreneurs nurtured in the Israeli 
Technology Incubator Programme. That research (Gimmon 2006) suggested that investors 
ignored certain aspects of human capital that appeared to predict early survival and growth, 
while selecting on another signal of human capital that the same research found not to have 
any significant effect on early survival and growth. 
 
Essentially this paper reports on the second stage of a mixed-method study the first stage of 
which was quantitative research that produced some unexpected but interesting results 
(Gimmon 2006). We summarize the first stage results below and then focus on the second 
stage which is qualitative in nature. Thus our research design fits the third of four possible 
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mixed methods designs as outlined by Morgan (1998: 369-370). Morgan commented on this 
design as follows:  
 ‘Here, the qualitative methods typically provide interpretive resources for understanding the results 
 from the quantitative research… For example, if the results of a survey contradict the original 
 hypotheses, it may make sense to seek an explanation from the respondents who provided the data 
 rather than engage in isolated speculation about what went wrong.’   
According to Morgan, such research designs ‘are increasingly common among survey 
researchers, who use follow-up interviews to expand on what was learned from the analysis of 
their questionnaires’.  
 
Qualitative follow-up studies of quantitative research findings are relatively rare in the 
management literature (for recent exceptions see Veryzer 2005; Burgess, McKee, and Kidd 
2005; Loane, Bell, and McNaughton 2006; Alkaraan and Northcott 2007). However, they 
have been conducted in health research for some time (e.g. Ornstein et al. 1993; Stange et al. 
1994) to investigate why health interventions did not work as expected. There is a direct 
correspondence from the health research context to the context of the current study, in which 
investment decisions (analogous to patient response) within a certain controlled context 
(analogous to treatment) did not operate as expected.  In our case, the findings of a 
quantitative study suggested that investors were missing valuable cues to relevant human 
capital, but the reasons why were not readily apparent from the quantitative data.  
 
By directly interacting with individuals that are the subject of the study, we aimed to gain 
their reflections on the research findings, and on our interpretations of the findings, and 
achieve a resolution of what Morey and Luthans (1984: 28) call the ‘insider’s view’ and the 
‘outsider’s’ view of a phenomenon, resulting in a plausible explanation for the original 
unexpected findings, ‘based as much as possible on the perspective of those being studied’ 
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(Elliott, Fischer, and Rennie 1999: 215). We also wished to find out if the phenomenon might 
exist beyond the original sample context. 
 
In the next section, we review the literature on investor decision-making and briefly 
summarize the results of the quantitative study in order to set the stage for the qualitative 
follow-up study that is the main focus of this paper. We then outline the methodology we 
used to reflect on the first stage results with investors, which consisted of in-depth interviews 
with multiple investors chosen using a replication logic. Next, we described the results of the 
interviews. Finally, we discuss the results and conclude with recommendations for investors 
and for further research.  
 
Venture investor decision-making 
 
Research on decision-making by investors in early stage ventures is complicated by the 
finding that ‘espoused’ criteria may not match ‘in-use’ criteria (Zacharakis and Meyer 1998; 
Shepherd 1999). This may be one reason for the divergence of views in the investor decision-
making literature about the relative importance of the entrepreneur and the market as 
investment criteria
1
. Some researchers and investors have argued that the capabilities and the 
attitudes of founding entrepreneurs are critical factors in the performance of new ventures 
(Rock 1987; Hart, Stevenson, and Dial 1995: 92; Greene, Brush, and Hart 1999) and in 
investors’ decisions (MacMillan, Siegel, and Subbanarasimha 1985; Muzyka, Birley, and 
Leleux 1996; Sudek 2007). Others suggest that VCs seek good industries (Zider 1998) or 
good markets (Zacharakis and Meyer 1998) over good people. There does seem to be general 
                                                 
1
 Another reason may be that the relative importance of different criteria may shift over time. 
We discuss this further in the concluding section. 
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agreement, however, that judging the quality of the entrepreneur is difficult for VCs 
(Kozmetsky, Gill, and Smilor 1985; Zacharakis and Meyer 1998; Smart 1999). For example, 
Bygrave and Timmons (1992: 6) quote the veteran venture capitalist Arthur Rock as saying 
‘nearly every mistake I’ve made has been in picking the wrong people, not the wrong idea’. In 
another example, the Silicon Valley VC Michael Moritz of Sequoia Capital, in an interview 
for the business newspaper Globes (Feldman 2005: 12, our translation), indicated that ‘VCs 
have great difficulties in a-priori evaluation of entrepreneurial characteristics and thus quite 
often they make mistakes in relation to these judgments’. In summary, evaluating 
entrepreneurial human capital is a vital skill for investors, but investors recognise their 
failings in this area and therefore more research is needed (Smart 1999: 72; Barney, Wright, 
and Ketchen 2001: 634; Riquelme and Watson 2002: 395). 
  
The literature provides two possible theory-based explanations for suboptimal judgment of 
human capital by investors: use of biases and heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; 
Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001) and signaling (Merton 1968; Spence 1974; Levy and 
Lazarovich-Porat 1995; Podolny 2005). They are reviewed separately in the next two sub-
sections. 
 
Biases and heuristics 
 
It has long been asserted that VCs often rely to a large extent on their intuition (Dominguez 
1974), and recent research suggests that angels do too (Sudek 2007).   VCs may match 
proposals to past successful or failed investments, demonstrating an ‘availability bias’ that 
can lead to overconfidence in evaluating new ventures which may lead to wrong investment 
decisions (Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001). Even highly experienced VCs may be susceptible 
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to various forms of bias and error due to their intuitive drive and heuristic processing 
(Shepherd, Zacharakis, and Baron 2003). These research findings fit with theories of bounded 
rationality (Simon 1955) and psychological economics theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; 
Kahneman and Riepe 1998: 53). Biases and cognitive illusions in intuitive judgment such as 
overconfidence, optimism, hindsight, and overreaction to random events could cause financial 
investors to disregard certain types of human capital and pay attention to other types that 
might have no value in that context. Zacharakis and Meyer (2000) suggested that research-
based actuarial models could aid investors to avoid such problems and thereby improve their 
decision-making.   
 
Signaling theory 
 
Founders communicate and signal their human and other forms of capital to financial 
investors in order to attract funds for their ventures (Busenitz, Fiet, and Moesel 2005), 
although they may not be aware which signals are important to investors and which are not
2
. 
For their part, VCs and business angels encounter information asymmetry problems when 
evaluating investment opportunities (Mason and Stark 2004). Economics-based signaling 
theory (Spence 1974) has been used to explain why financial investors use indirect measures 
of risk, such as founders’ own financial investment in the venture, as ‘signals’ of risk when 
more direct measures of risk are absent (Levy and Lazarovich-Porat 1995). It could also be 
used to explain why VCs prefer serial entrepreneurs (MacMillan, Siegel, and Subbanarasimha 
1985; Wright, Robbie, and Ennew 1997). Founders could create false signals, however, or 
                                                 
2
 This is suggested by the remarks of many commentators on the VC scene who decry the 
poor quality of many pitches and business plans. As an example, Guy Kawasaki (2004: 45) 
attributes his tinnitus to ‘listening to thousands of lousy pitches’. 
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investors could choose inaccurate signals. Indeed, some studies have shown no particular 
performance advantage of serial entrepreneurs over inexperienced entrepreneurs (Birley and 
Westhead 1993; Wright, Robbie, and Ennew 1997; Westhead, Ucbasaran, and Wright 2005). 
One way in which investors can minimize false signals is to deal with entrepreneurs they 
know. Both Shane and Stuart (2002) and Hsu (2007) found that prior links with VCs 
increased the chances of an entrepreneur receiving VC funding. This seems to fit sociology-
based signaling theory, which emphasises the social character of economic exchange under 
conditions of market uncertainty (Podolny 1994) and reinforces the view that assessing 
entrepreneurs is a real issue for investors.  
 
What do investors do if they are faced with a ‘market’ of only first time entrepreneurs of 
early-stage high technology ventures? Such a market would be a very uncertain one, as the 
investor could rely neither on previous start-up experience of the entrepreneur, nor previous 
venture investment experience with the entrepreneur. This leaves social status as a possible 
signal of legitimacy (Shane and Khurana 2003: 520). Podolny (2005: 18) has proposed that 
‘the greater market participants’ uncertainty about the underlying quality of a producer and 
the producer’s product, the more that market participants will rely on the producer’s status to 
make inferences about quality’. If Podolny’s hypothesis is correct, and if the investor’s chosen 
measure of status does not reflect entrepreneurial capability, then the investor is likely to 
make sub-optimal investment decisions. On the other hand, investment in high status 
individuals may have a self-fulfilling, or ‘Matthew’ effect (Merton 1968; Podolny 1993; 
Podolny and Stuart 1995), in which status attracts resources which then increases the 
likelihood of success.  
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Hsu (2007) found that in a sample of early stage technology-based start-ups in the emerging 
Internet industry, teams with a doctorate degree holder were significantly more likely to get 
VC investment and receive higher valuations. Hsu interpreted this as a signaling effect. 
Signaling theories tend to be ‘difficult, if not impossible, to test empirically’ (Levy and 
Lazarovich-Porat 1995: 39) because of the difficulty of holding all other parameters constant. 
However, Gimmon (2006) conducted a study in which many of these parameters are held 
constant. His sample was 193 high-tech new ventures, a 20% random sample of ventures 
nurtured in the Israeli Technology Incubator Programme between 1991 and 2001
3
. This 
sample offered a good test of the hypothesis that in highly uncertain markets, market 
participants rely on status as signals of quality, for two reasons. First, the criteria of entry to 
the incubator system were that the participants were first-time entrepreneurs and that the 
technology was new and its commercialisation potential uncertain. Second, search for external 
funding was mandated as part of the incubation process, and the participants were required to 
leave the incubator after two years. Thus the socialisation process with investors was to a 
considerable extent equalised by the incubator system
4
.  
 
Gimmon (2006) found that financial investors (both VCs and angels) were not significantly 
more or less likely to invest in ventures where the founders possessed certain forms of human 
capital that positively affected venture survival and growth
5
, such as being a technologist, 
bringing one’s own technology to the venture, and having transferred the technology to 
                                                 
3
 For a comprehensive introduction to the Israeli technology incubator programme and high-
tech VC in Israel, see Avnimelech, Schwartz and Bar-El (2007). 
4
 The study controlled for geographical location of the incubator.  
5
 The mean time span for the sample firms (including those that had died) from the time of 
entry to the incubator to the outcome measurement was seven years. 
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others. However, investors were significantly more likely to invest in ventures whose 
founders possessed high academic status, specifically a PhD degree or the title of Professor. 
Yet academic status had no effect on survival and growth during the period of study.  
 
While selection on the basis of status symbols finds a plausible explanation in signaling 
theory for this particular sample
6
, what is less readily explainable is why investors did not 
select more explicitly on the founder’s technological expertise, given the early 
commercialisation phase of these ventures. In this paper, we seek answers to this puzzling 
result. One possibility is that the investors may have assumed technological ability from 
academic status. Yet the technology on which a venture is founded may not necessarily have 
any connection with the founder’s PhD thesis topic. To give an example, the results suggested 
that within the Israeli Technology Incubator system, an individual starting a high-tech 
business who had a PhD in economics but had not developed the technology on which it was 
based would find it easier to raise money than a Masters level engineer who had developed 
the technology and managed to licence it for another application. Another possibility is that 
technological capability had a low priority among the investors. Both of these possibilities 
pointed to sub-optimal decision-making, given the results of the quantitative study. 
 
                                                 
6
 It is possible that status-based selection may have been made with a view to long term value, 
because status may confer advantages such as easier access to other high-status individuals 
and organizations (Podolny 1993; 1994; Podolny and Stuart 1995). However, this does not 
alter the main puzzle which is why would investors ignore easy to measure signals of specific 
technological capability. Furthermore, those with high academic status were slightly more 
likely to be immigrants, mainly from Russia (the correlation coefficient was 0.256, p<.05) and 
thus likely to have less local links to high status individuals and organizations, not more. 
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In addition to asking why might investors follow signals such as academic status while 
ignoring other, easily measured, factors that enhance survival and growth, we also wondered 
if this phenomenon was wider than the rather special situation of the Israeli Technology 
Incubator Programme. Given the practical implications of this issue for investors, we 
followed the logic of the quantitative → qualitative mixed methods research design (Morgan 
1998) to see what investors from different backgrounds would think of the results, and what 
they made of our interpretations. In the next section, we explain how we did this. 
 
Methodology 
 
To explore reasons why investors might ignore cues of human capital, we opted for a 
qualitative methodology using data gathered from intensive semi-structured interviews with 
investors chosen on a replication logic, similar to the logic used in the multiple case method 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2003). This interview data is not as rich in overlapping or redundant 
data as a typical in-depth case study, grounded theory-based piece of research (Flyvbjerg 
2006). This is because we were following the multi-method, quantitative → qualitative 
approach (Morgan 1998), in which the purpose of data collection in the qualitative phase was 
to gather investor’s stated views on the earlier research, not to document their in-use criteria, 
as that had already been done in the quantitative study. We did however follow the general 
logic and protocol of multiple case designs (Yin 2003) in which replications are conducted 
under different experimental conditions to see whether the findings could still be duplicated. 
Accordingly, we sought maximum variation (Flyvberg 2006) along multiple investor 
characteristics between the cases, while holding the specific context of early stage technology 
venture investing constant. If early stage technology venture investors from a wide range of 
backgrounds accorded with our interpretation of the findings of the quantitative study, this 
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would increase the plausibility of the interpretation. On the other hand, if a wide variety of 
different explanations were offered, we would need to rethink the interpretation of the 
quantitative findings. 
 
Prior to the interviews that contributed the data for this paper, we conducted a pilot in which 
two VCs and two angels were interviewed. The results of these pilot interviews were not 
included in the current study, but they helped us to form the question plan and to practice 
questioning investors. The replication logic then led us to choose six examples of early stage 
technology-based venture investors working under very different conditions. 
 
We wanted to see if the phenomenon had wider application outside the Israeli Technological 
Incubator system, and so our basic selection grid has national context (US, UK, and Israel) as 
one dimension and type of early stage technology venture investor (VC or business angel) as 
the other. The three nations were chosen as they differ in size but all have relatively well-
developed VC and business angel communities (Bygrave 2005). However, within this grid, 
we chose investors that differ from each other in many ways: by gender, experience, tendency 
to co-invest, industry preference, average amount invested, and whether the business model 
was equity-based capital gain or product income stream-based.  
 
In all, ten investors were interviewed separately for one hour using the convenience sampling 
method outlined by Fried and Hisrich (1995) but within the grid of ‘three countries, two 
investor types’. We then selected six of these to maximise difference between investors 
without letting the sample size get so big that we would have to sacrifice richness for breadth 
in our reporting of results, as recommended by Elliott, Fischer, and Rennie (1999: 223) for 
qualitative studies that aim to uncover a general understanding of a phenomenon. The 
selection was also made to ensure a balanced sample (one investor of each type in each of 
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three nations). The final selection was made based on the characteristics of the investors, not 
on their answers to our questions. We did check to see if the findings would have been 
different had we reported on the full sample of interviews, by comparing data tables with all 
interviews to data tables with the smaller sample. No major differences were apparent.  
 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics on each investor. Appendix 1 lists the questions asked 
and the order in which they were asked. Respondents were told the study was on investment 
criteria in high tech ventures and were not sent information or papers on prior research in 
advance. We first used open-ended questions to elucidate their ‘espoused’ evaluation criteria 
generally, and then more specifically asked whether and how they assess the human capital of 
high tech venture founders in practice. Of course, we cannot know if they actually used these 
criteria in practice. The reason for asking for their criteria was so that we could confront them 
with the revealed, or ‘in-use’ criteria from the previous study after they had revealed their 
‘espoused’ criteria, to stimulate discussion on the puzzling findings. We then presented the 
results of the quantitative study, variable by variable and asked the investors what they 
thought the reasons might be for these results. Finally, we presented some results of prior 
research (Shepherd 1999; Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001) on investor decision-making that 
underpinned our interpretation of the results, and sought their views. Shepherd (1999) had 
suggested a gap between espoused and in-use investment criteria and Zacharakis and 
Shepherd (2001) suggested that VCs rely on gut feeling rather than objective criteria. We put 
the latter two studies forward as possible explanations of the quantitative results, and asked 
for the investors’ views. 
 
 [Insert Table 1 about here] 
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The interviews were taped and transcribed. We then sought patterns in this textual data by 
looking for consistencies and inconsistencies in the explanations given by investors before 
and after the presentation of our results, by tabulating data and comparing responses across all 
respondents, as recommended by Myles and Huberman (1994) for cross-case analysis. The 
data in the tables are not intended to be interpreted as revealing associations between 
variables in a hypothesis-testing way. Rather, they are designed to reveal possible patterns in 
complex data from which explanations (theory) could be induced.  
 
The methodology adopted here is different to previous methods used in this area, such as only 
asking VCs for their evaluation criteria, or simulation exercises that assume that VCs act 
alone in making decisions. In this study, patterns of actual investments made, reflecting true 
‘in-use’ criteria (the findings of the quantitative study), were contrasted against espoused 
criteria which were previously revealed without prior knowledge of the quantitative study. 
Then, investors were asked to provide their own explanations for the findings of the 
quantitative study. Some of these findings conflict with their espoused criteria, reflecting the 
gap noted by Shepherd (1999). Others findings relate to decision variables that were not 
mentioned by the investors, perhaps reflecting the ‘limited introspection’ also noted by 
Shepherd (1999: 85). We hoped that this method of confronting ‘espoused’ with ‘in-use 
criteria’ would encourage deeper reflection than is normally observed in studies of investor 
decision-making (Zacharakis and Meyer 1998). 
 
In the next section, we describe the espoused evaluation criteria of our interviewees, their 
explanations for the findings of the quantitative study, and their reaction to the findings of 
other research on investor decision-making, before discussing their implications for investors, 
entrepreneurs and further research in the final section.  
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Results 
 
Espoused Evaluation Criteria 
 
Table 2 shows the criteria that the interviewees stated they used to make investment decisions. 
They all mentioned one ‘most important’ criterion. Both US interviewees chose market 
potential as their number one criterion, whereas all of the other interviewees mentioned ‘the 
entrepreneur’ or ‘the management’ as their top criterion. Consistent with this, the US 
investors mentioned prior sales or significant client interest whereas the others did not. The 
US investors also mentioned directly or indirectly location as a criterion, whereas the other 
investors did not. Table 2 shows that there was no apparent difference between VCs and 
angels on what evaluation criteria were used. 
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
Investors’ opinions on previous findings  
 
Table 3 shows that while most investors agreed with the quantitative research findings once 
they were presented with them individually, there were some differences of opinion and some 
people agreed on the importance of criteria that they had not previously espoused. Only four 
out of six investors mentioned technological capability of the founder as an investment 
criterion in advance of the presentation of the findings. The US investors were not convinced 
about the importance of the founder being a technologist, with the VC adding the caveat that 
it was important for ‘super-high tech’. This may reflect the greater weight these US investors 
placed on the market rather than the initial management. As the US angel put it:   
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‘We’re looking to harvest investments not commercialise technologies, so we have to think about – OK 
 the assumption is that this product will make it to the marketplace; now, will anybody buy it? Will 
 somebody have the leadership to develop this firm?’   
The US angel pointed out that possibly the lack of discrimination on this feature might be a 
result of the due diligence process, where assessment of the potential in the technology is 
separate from the assessment of management. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Both Israeli investors disagreed with the quantitative research findings that founder’s tacit 
knowledge of technology was important, although the other investors tended to agree, even 
though only two of them (the US VC and UK angel) had mentioned it previously as an 
espoused criterion. The Israeli VC commented:  
 ‘Tacit knowledge may be important in the short range, but not in the long range, moreover not for exit... 
 Tacit knowledge is ‘nice to have’ but it does not relate to the founder’s execution capabilities which are 
 more important.’  
The Israeli angel stated that it may help but was not crucial, since founders can further 
develop other inventors’ work. 
 
Investors tended to take issue with the quantitative research findings that academic credentials 
attracted financial investment, and their explanations of the findings conflicted. Some 
suggested that having a PhD might make a difference, especially if it was in a relevant 
domain, and professors might have value in R&D.   
 
Whether the founder had transferred the technology to a third party was not mentioned 
specifically by the investors as a criterion, although the US investors did have prior sales as 
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an investment criterion and this could be seen as a type of sale. After being presented with the 
finding that this variable predicted survival and growth but not investment, investors tended to 
argue that this would be a bonus: ‘If a business has a licence, that’s great’ (UKAng). 
 
Similarly with early sales and number of patents, only two investors (sales) and one investor 
(patents) mentioned these as espoused criteria without prompting, but in discussion of the 
findings of the quantitative study they all agreed that these were positive features.  
 
Investors offered a range of other human capital features they looked for in the entrepreneur
7
. 
Both US investors mentioned the issue of succession and stated they explicitly looked for 
people who would be willing to recognise when it was time to step aside. As the US angel put 
it:  
 ‘We are not particularly skilled at coming up with a good appraisal of their willingness to build a 
 leadership team and step aside at the right time. If an entrepreneur smells the fact that coachability
8
 is 
 important, they can hide that for a long time, surely until after they get the money. I think technology 
 skills, especially for a PhD or someone are much more transparent. I mean, gosh you’ve written 20 
 papers let’s see if we can call around and see what we can find out about you.’   
 
[Inset Table 4 about here] 
                                                 
7
 The investors were also presented with findings on gender, age and origin/minority status, 
none of which significantly affected survival/early growth or investment. Most investors did 
not espouse these as criteria, although one had a preference for younger entrepreneurs, the 
Israeli investor practised affirmative action with female entrepreneurs and the two UK 
investors favoured immigrants. 
8
 A euphemism for acceptance of one’s management limitations and the need to step aside at a 
time that is best for the venture. 
 18 
 
The pattern of responses in Table 4 suggests that the Israeli and UK investors were more 
likely to look for team players, but this may stem from similar concerns over the ability of the 
founder entrepreneur to grow a professional management team. As the UK angel said:  
 ‘The big cause of failure has usually been personality issues, something with the team that started to 
 crumble and fall apart. I think it’s because the entrepreneur tends to ride roughshod over others’.  
 
The attempted solution in Israel and the UK, though, appeared to be to try to ensure the 
entrepreneur could grow a team, rather than the US investors’ approach which appeared to be 
to accept that the initial entrepreneur will probably have to be replaced and therefore look for 
a founder who was willing to accept this. Investor compatibility was also a general theme 
across the three countries and both types of investor. Some investors linked this to the 
subjective aspect of investment decision-making, and several noted that this took a long time 
to assess and was a ‘deal killer’. 
 
Table 5 shows that, when presented with propositions drawn from three pieces of research: 
the Gimmon (2006), Shepherd (1999) and Shepherd and Zacharakis (2001) studies 
(corresponding to questions 1, 2, 3 of Section 4, Appendix 1), the investors were divided on 
the proposition from the first study but tended to agree with the propositions from the latter 
two studies.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Investors were divided on the first proposition that investors often misjudge founders’ human 
capital, with three disagreeing with the proposition that investors often misjudge founders’ 
human capital, specifically the technological expertise of founders of high-tech ventures, one 
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agreeing, and two saying yes and no. Here is a selection of opinions that illustrate the 
diversity of opinions: 
‘It’s a bit tricky. You just meet them a few times and get a bit of a feeling about their attitudes but you 
can’t really know how they are going to behave when their back is against the wall. You have got to 
take some of that on trust. That’s probably the trickiest thing actually is assessing the individual’. 
(UKAng) 
 ‘I think it’s easy. Studying the financials, that’s just made up. Studying the entrepreneur, there’s a lot 
of data to go on. I look for what they’ve done in the past, what other people say about them and I look a 
lot at how they deal with me as a potential investor as a potential board member. I have a little bit of a 
bias in that direction as I [have] a doctorate in psychology. How they try to sell me, work with me, how 
they respond, do they get defensive – all those kinds of things to me are just more data’. (USVC) 
‘I think that by far and away the toughest piece of due diligence is trying to appraise the quality of the 
team and that hasn’t much changed much over time; it is a very time-consuming, difficult analysis. I 
think the more experience an entrepreneur has in starting and running companies the easier the due 
diligence is because there are more other investors you can go to and talk about. So I would say more 
experienced, serial entrepreneurs are easier to judge than the new ones’. (USAng) 
 ‘Sometimes judgements are wrong since human beings are unpredictable. Also the founders may be 
fine but do not fit with their environment, for example there may be a lack of compatibility with their 
investors. In any case, the evaluation process may indeed be faulty because of unprofessional 
evaluators.’ (IsraVC) 
 
On the other hand, the investors tended to agree with the propositions of the other two studies 
that a gap existed between espoused and in-use evaluation criteria and that investors suffered 
from availability bias. The Israeli angel suggested that the gap may arise because of a 
tendency for investors to ‘follow the herd’ rather than adhere to their espoused criteria. The 
UK VC thought that much more could be done to improve this side of investment decision-
making:  
  ‘[The] traditional approach, P&L based - that’s the one they [VCs] talk to. When you get them in 
 private conversation, it’s more about private judgment; it’s more about gut feeling about the 
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 personalities. I think that’s a problem because while the mathematical approaches have been refined and 
 developed, the other bits haven’t, but they play an equally if not more important part in the judgement 
 process. So because people are not talking about them, not open about them, they are not being 
 developed. There’s probably a lot that could be contributed from academia as to how those subjective 
 decisions are made, but nobody’s willing to talk about those subjective decisions’. (UKVCap) 
 
In summary, several possible explanations were provided by investors for the results of the 
quantitative study: 
1. Investors seek exits rather than early survival and growth, and the former has precedence in 
assessment, thus technological expertise may not be comprehensively assessed given time 
constraints but assumed from high level signals such as academic status; 
2. Investors rely on both gut feeling and rational criteria; 
3. Investors are subject to their own biases and heuristics; they recognize these as inevitable 
constraints and not necessarily only negative constraints; 
4. Founders send signals which misrepresent their effective human capital resources and thus 
mislead investors.  
 
Overall, the investors’ comments suggest that while investors recognise that they do rely on 
gut feeling alongside more objective criteria, and don’t always make decisions in the way they 
say they do, most of them think that they do a fairly good job of assessing founders on 
average, and also a ‘better than average’ job. In summary, the interviewees substantiated the 
two theoretical explanations provided by the literature for suboptimal judgment of human 
capital as reviewed above, but did not all accept our proposition that investors often misjudge 
human capital, and that this explains the puzzling results of the quantitative study.  
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Improving assessment of human capital 
 
All except one investor felt that the process of assessing founders’ human capital could be 
improved. The one dissenter (who had a PhD in psychology) felt that the problem lay with 
some individual investors, not with available processes. There was little agreement over 
possible solutions. Suggestions included involving headhunters and HR experts in the 
process, as they were found to be more objective, sharing of experiences among investors, 
courses or seminars and spending more time with the entrepreneurs.  
 
 Discussion 
 
The research question we sought to answer was: why might investors in early stage high tech 
ventures founded by first-time entrepreneurs follow signals such as academic status that have 
no effect on early survival and growth while ignoring other, easily measured, factors that 
enhance survival and growth, and is this phenomenon wider than the rather special situation 
of the Israeli Technology incubator system?  We found clear differences of opinion between 
the investors we interviewed on the importance of technology-related human capital variables. 
These are the variables that showed the least association between in-use evaluation criteria of 
investors and venture early survival and growth in the quantitative study, a finding that led to 
the current follow-on qualitative study. However, investors tended to agree that they differed 
in their espoused and in-use investment criteria and that they suffered from availability bias.  
 
The investors resolved the conflict between their views and the study results in a number of 
ways: by arguing that exit value rather than survivability was the main criterion of 
assessment, by focusing on management rather than technological capabilities of the founder, 
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and by arguing that the biases and heuristics employed in decision-making were not 
necessarily sub-optimal.  In the next subsection, we reflect on their views and integrate them 
with theory to form our answer to the research question. Then we caveat the discussion by 
outlining the limitations of our study, and finally we make recommendations for practitioners 
and for further research. 
 
Explaining the Original Puzzling Result 
 
Combining our qualitative follow-on study findings with the literature review, we propose the 
following explanation for the puzzling findings of the original quantitative study. First, we 
combine the two alternative theoretical explanations we reviewed earlier: ‘biases and 
heuristics’ (Shepherd 1999; Zacharakis and Shepherd 2001) and ‘signaling’ (Podolny 2005; 
Hsu 2007). We see these two theories as views of the same phenomenon but from different 
sides of the investment relationship (see Figure 1). Entrepreneurs transmit a variety of cues
9
 to 
future performance, some consciously as signals and some unconsciously. They do not 
necessarily know which cues or signals are most relevant, either to future performance or to 
investors. Investors select some cues and some signals through a filter of biases and 
heuristics, and seek further information on some cues and signals in a due diligence process. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
                                                 
9
 We follow animal ecology nomenclature (Maynard Smith and Harper 2003) in which cues 
are features that can be used by a receptor as a guide to future action, irrespective of whether 
this is intended by the transmitter, while signals are cues that are intended to or have evolved 
to transmit a certain quality. 
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In an uncertain market for VC such as that available in the Israeli technology incubators, or in 
any emerging industry, where normal cues such as entrepreneurship experience or prior 
contact with investors are absent, investors rely on signals. Investors make decisions on 
relatively few criteria (Zacharakis and Meyer 1998). Since capital gain is their principal goal, 
they focus on factors that affect this (such as the market and whether they can find 
management for the firm to make it dominate the market) and devote less effort in due 
diligence on factors that might affect survival, such as founder’s technology-specific 
expertise. In the case of the Israeli Technology Incubator entrepreneurs, academic status may 
have been interpreted by investors as a signal of technological ability and/or a signal of high 
quality scientific networks and high status generally. While the latter may or may not be an 
indicator of future value, academic status does not closely measure the specific tacit 
knowledge that may be needed to get the technology working in a commercial setting early in 
a venture’s life (Murray 1999; 2004; Gimmon, 2006). Time pressure and limited attention 
magnifies the impact of this highly visible signal, crowding out the more accurate but less 
visible cues of specific technological ability. 
 
Limitations 
 
Both the original quantitative study and this follow-on study have limitations. First, the 
findings apply at most to first time founders of high technology ventures, not to all ventures 
seeking VC. Second, the original study measured venture performance in terms of survival 
and growth, whereas investors are focused on long term exit value. Third, it was based on a 
random sample of early stage high technology ventures with a unique experience – the Israeli 
Technology Incubator Programme. These ventures could not be said to be representative of all 
new high technology ventures in Israel (Avnimelech, Schwartz and Bar-El 2007) or 
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elsewhere. Given the recent findings of Hsu (2007), however, they may have wider 
application than just the Israeli Incubator Programme, and could apply to first time founders 
in any emerging market. Also, survival and growth is necessary for long term value creation, 
and that therefore factors that enhance survival and growth are worth considering in addition 
to factors that enhance long term value. 
 
The limitations of this follow-up study include the small number of interviews that cannot be 
said to be representative in a statistical sense, and the nature of the data gathered: one-time 
interviews rather than in-depth observation of decision-making. We acknowledge these 
limitations and address them in our recommendations for further research. In relation to 
representativeness, in the first study the intention was to control for many non-human capital 
factors so that the effect of technological capability could be detected. In the qualitative study, 
our intention was to maximise variance, not seek representativeness, so that the views of the 
widest possible range of early stage high technology investors could be compared. Thus these 
limitations were part of the research design so that particular associations could be revealed or 
explained.  In the next stage of research, we propose addressing these limitations, as outlined 
in the final subsection below. 
 
Possible Implications for Investors 
 
The results of this study suggest that, in emerging industries, investors give technology 
commercialisation capability lower priority over longer term issues of market potential and 
harvest in the limited due diligence time available. They do not appear to assess the specific 
technological capability of the founder in much detail, or if they do, it is on the basis of 
academic status. If one views early-stage high technology venture investment as akin to 
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taking an option on an uncertain future income stream (McGrath and MacMillan 2000) then it 
seems sensible to select on the basis of early stage survivability as well as long term value 
creation, particularly in the case of new technologies where commercialisation routines are 
not codified and still emerging and tacit (Murray 1999, 2004). By selecting on both 
dimensions, investors can reduce the proportion of investments that fail to launch, thereby 
increasing the proportion of cash available to support venture growth among the most 
promising to survive the launch stage. 
 
Prospective investors in high technology ventures led by a first-time founder could benefit 
therefore by examining both the general and specific technological human capital of the 
founder in order to improve their decision-making. They could do this by digging a little 
deeper than academic titles and seek to understand the extent to which the founder has both 
general technological expertise and tacit knowledge of the specific technology underlying the 
business. The quantitative study suggested that simple heuristics such as ‘did the founder 
bring their own technology to the venture’, ‘are they a technologist by occupation’ and ‘have 
they transferred the technology to others’ would be more effective than ‘has the founder got 
an academic title’ in relation to survival and growth. We recognise that it is possible that 
academic status may confer other benefits to the venture (although this has not been tested), 
and therefore we are not suggesting that investors drop this as a criterion, but supplement it 
with other cues of technological capability.  
 
Further research 
 
Further research could continue this iterative process of understanding what matters in 
investment decision-making in new high tech ventures led by first-time founders in regard to 
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various aspects of founders’ human capital, and address some limitations of this study. First, 
the sample of ventures could be revisited to track performance over the long term. In addition 
to measuring survival and growth, it would be important to measure venture value. The 
follow-up quantitative study could identify whether academic status positively affects value, 
as suggested by status theory. One way of assessing value for those ventures that had not yet 
exited would be to task a panel of expert valuers to estimate the value of the survivors of the 
cohort based on a standard set of indicators. Another avenue would be to take a portfolio 
approach by comparing performance of investee firms in investors’ portfolios with objective 
measures of their founders’ human capital. A third approach could be to study the extent to 
which experienced investors use different decision criteria from ‘virgin’ investors (Mason and 
Harrison 1993) or non-investors. A fourth option would be to interview simultaneously 
investors and entrepreneurs of the same new ventures in regard to the investment decision 
criteria of both parties, given that the entrepreneurs are their own first investor. These studies 
might lead to additional simple evaluation aids for investors’ decision making processes. 
 
Our replication interview design revealed some apparent patterns in relative importance of the 
entrepreneur and the market that, while not significant in any statistical sense, are interesting 
in the light of recent cross-national research on venture capitalists’ investment criteria 
(Zacharakis et al. 2007). Specifically, while all investors listed broadly similar criteria, 
consistent with earlier cross-national literature (Knight 1994), and both US investors 
identified the market as the most important investment criterion, consistent with the 
quantitative finding of Zacharakis, McMullen, and Shepherd, all four UK and Israeli investors 
identified the entrepreneur as their most important investment criterion. This seems to run 
counter to Zacaharakis, McMullen and Shepherd’s hypothesis, based on institutional theory, 
that VCs in rules-based market economies rely on market information to a greater extent 
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while VCs in transitional economies weight human capital factors more heavily, since both 
the UK and Israel are rules-based market economies, coming 6
th
 and 37
th
, respectively, out of 
157 countries rated by the Index of Economic Freedom
10
.  
 
Interestingly, many of the early US-based studies on espoused criteria emphasised the 
entrepreneur (e.g. Wells 1972; Poindexter 1976; Tyebjee and Bruno 1984; Macmillan, Siegel, 
and Subbanarasimha 1985; Macmillan, Siemann, and Subbanarasimha 1987), reflecting 
General Doriot’s famous remark in a 1963 TIME magazine interview11 ‘a grade-A man with a 
grade-B idea is better than a grade-B man with a grade-A idea’ and similar comments by 
Arthur Rock quoted in the literature review above. Rock himself (1987: 67) noted with 
apparent regret a shift in high tech investing from looking for the best people to looking for 
‘the largest untapped market or the highest projected returns or the cleverest business 
strategy’. Later studies and commentaries on the US VC industry (e.g. Hall and Hofer 1993; 
Zacharakis and Meyer 1998; Zider 1998; Zacharakis et al. 2007) have emphasised market 
aspects, although recent US-based studies of business angel criteria do not show the same 
shift (May and O’Halloran 2003; Sudek 2007). 
 
We also observed that the US investors stressed the need for the entrepreneur to be willing to 
step aside once the business was growing to allow more experienced management to take it to 
the next level. Investors did not look forward to having to do this, and this feature weighed 
heavily in their decision-making. But they recognised that this might be necessary if the 
market potential was to be exploited fully and the value of the venture maximised. The Israeli 
                                                 
10
 http://www.heritage.org/index/ accessed 16 October 2007 
11
 http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,896620,00.html  
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VC explicitly recognised these country differences in interview and suggested more research 
and data on venture capital is needed outside of the US:  
 ‘In Israel more than in the US it is [more] difficult to judge the quality of the entrepreneur, since the 
 population of potential founders is too small and the history of start-ups is too short.’  
 
As Zacharakis, McMullen, and Shepherd (2007: 693) point out, ‘the US venture capital 
industry is the largest and oldest’. A meta-analysis of the literature on investor decision-
making might reveal whether entrepreneur and market as criteria have shifted in relative 
importance in the US as its VC industry has matured. While fewer studies have been 
conducted in other countries, we speculate that VC industries elsewhere, being smaller and 
younger, and with smaller pools of experienced venture management talent with VC 
experience to draw on, may still adhere to the entrepreneur-based model of investment.  
 
Another possibility is that US VCs are more focused on returns than risk, while VCs in other 
countries like the UK and Israel may be more focused on risk than return. This is suggested 
by the results of regression analysis on US VC investment criteria by Tyebjee and Bruno 
(1984), who found that Market Attractiveness was a determinant of expected return, while 
Management Capabilities was a determinant of risk, and a comparative analysis of investment 
criteria of VCs from US, Canada, Europe and Asia-Pacific by Knight (1994), who found that 
US VCs rated market growth and returns higher as investment criteria than non-US VCs. 
Knight (1994: 31) also found that Canadian VCs were becoming more demanding over time. 
These alternative hypotheses of differences in relative weighting given to investment criteria 
in different countries might be worth investigating in a systematic fashion with large samples 
of investors drawn from a selection of rules-based economies whose VC industries vary in 
age.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual model explaining suboptimal investment decision-making in uncertain markets for venture 
capital 
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Table 1. Investor characteristics 
 
Respondent 
Code 
US-VC1 
 
US-Ang1 
 
Isra-VC1 
 
Isra-Ang1 
 
UK-VC1 
 
UK-Ang1 
 
Respondent 
gender 
M M F M M M 
Stage of invested 
ventures 
Seed, early 
stage 
Seed + follow-on 
rounds 
Seed+ Early 
stage 
Seed Startup, early 
stage, mature 
Seed 
Coinvestment Yes Yes: active in 
angel syndicate 
Yes No Yes: lead 
investor 
No: lone, first 
investor 
Industry sector Mostly 
tech 
Any (including hi 
tech) 
IT DSP + life 
science 
Bioscience Hi tech 
Type of 
investment 
equity equity equity equity Product 
income streams 
equity 
Years in 
investments 
5 26 10 5 10 12 
No. of proposal 
reviewed 
1000 2000 1000 dozens 350 600 
No. investments 
made 
4 32 cos., 60-75 
investments 
dozens 5 20 20 
Average amount 
of investment 
$1million Slightly more 
than $25k
a
 
$5million $Tens of 
thousands  
£1-2million £20k-£25k 
 
arespondent mentioned some much bigger investments that would skew the average 
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Table 2. Major investment criteria 
 
Investor 
Code 
US-VC1 
 
US-Ang1 
 
Isra-VC1 
 
Isra-Ang1 
  
UK-VC1 
 
UK-Ang1 
 
Industry sector 
 
(+)  (+) + (+) (+) 
Market potential 
 
+++ +++ + +  + + 
The entrepreneur/the 
management 
+ + +++ +++ +++ +++ 
Competitive advantage 
 
 + + +   
Innovative idea 
 
+   (+)  +++ 
Execution feasibility  
 
 + +    
$ required (not too high) 
 
 +  +   
Protected IP  
 
   +   
Sales or significant client 
interest 
+ +     
Location 
 
(+) +     
 
+
  this factor was mentioned   
(+)
  this factor was mentioned implicitly rather than explicitly   
+++
 this factor was stated to be the most important 
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Table 3. Interviewee comments on quantitative study findings 
 
Respondent 
Code 
Significant effect in 
original study on
a
: 
Investment criterion for investor?
a,b
 
survival/growth investment US-VC US-Ang Isra-VC Isra-Ang UK-VC UK-Ang 
Founder was 
technologist 
1 0 B1 
for super high tech for 
startup only  
A1/0 
(army effect?)   
B0 
A0 
‘Interesting 
statistic but not 
very compelling’ 
B1 
A1 
technological 
background is 
important 
B1 
A1 
B1 
A1 
‘but with an eye 
to getting it to a 
product’ 
B0 
A1 
Managerial 
Experience 
1 1 B1 
A1 
B1 
A1 
B1 
A1 
B1 
A1 
B1 
A1 
B1 
A1 
Tacit 
knowledge 
1 0 B1 
A1/0 
(arguments for and against) 
B0 
A0 
‘may be 
insignificant in 
final analysis’ 
B0 
A0 
 in depth 
understanding is 
not necessary 
B0 
A0 
may help but 
not crucial 
B0 
connection to 
market more 
important 
A0 
B1 
A1 
‘VCs more 
interested in 
market traction’ 
Academic 
credentials 
(Dr. / Prof.) 
0 1 B1 
if related to the field and is 
balanced by abilities 
A0 
‘May be different in the US’ 
B0 
A0 
B0 
A0 
B1 
A0 
B0 
A0 
‘for some it does 
seem to be a tick 
in the box’ 
B0 (PhDs) 
A0 
B1 (Profs maybe)  
A0 
Technology 
transferred to 
third party 
1 0 B0 
A1 
‘it’s external validation’ 
B0 
A1/0 
‘neutral’ 
B0 
A1 
‘makes sense, not 
come across it’ 
B0 
A1 
‘may affect 
funding’ 
B0 
A1 
‘that would be a 
big plus for us’ 
B0 
A1 
‘Licenses are 
great news’ 
Attained early 
sales 
1 1 B1 
A1 
‘proof and validity, improves 
ability to do due diligence’ 
B1 
A1 
B0 
A1 
fully agree 
B0 
A1 
fully agree 
B1 
A1 
shows customer 
focus 
B0 
A1 
‘something I look 
for, if possible’ 
No. of Patent 
applications 
1 1 B0 
A1 
 ‘indicator of protection and 
network’ 
B0 
A1 
 ‘hints at platform 
technology’ 
B0 
A1 
‘Important but 
not vital, some 
VCs regard 
patents highly’ 
B1 
‘less important 
criterion’ 
A1 
fully agree 
B0 
A1 
‘indicates 
company is 
innovative, it’s a 
strong point’ 
B0 
A1 
‘you do have to 
be very conscious 
of it now’ 
a
 1 = yes; 0 = no   
b
 B = Before being presented with results of quantitative study;  A = After being presented with results of quantitative study 
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Table 4. Other investment criteria mentioned by interviewees following presentation of quantitative findings 
Respondent 
Code 
US-VC 
 
US-Ang 
 
Isra-VC 
 
Isra-Ang 
 
UK-VC 
 
UK-Ang 
 
Other: 
leadership 
 A leader; integrity  Ability to write 
business plan 
Integrity  Focus, strategy 
Other: Business 
orientation 
  R&D management Business 
orientation 
Cares about product 
and customer 
global awareness 
Other: 
commitment 
 Both feet in; 
passion, 
commitment 
maturity Fully dedicated & 
investing own 
capital 
Passion; enthusiasm Global ambition  
Other: investor 
compatibility 
Someone I’d like 
to work with 
 Compatibility with 
the VC 
Compatibility with 
investors 
Do we like the people Good personality 
Other: Team 
player 
  Team rather than a 
single 
Team work  Team player 
Other: fortitude Can handle 
adversity 
  Long runner Work 
under pressure 
stamina driven 
Other: recognises 
own weaknesses 
Will take advice; 
willingness to 
step aside 
Coachability Ready to be 
replaced one day 
   
Other: 
communicator 
Communicator, 
seller 
     
Other: Entrepren-
eurial skills 
Entrepreneurship 
generally 
   Track record in 
entrepreneurship 
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Table 5: Investors’ views on research findingsa 
 
Investor 
Code 
US-VC US-Ang Isra-VC 
 
Isra-Ang  UK-VC UK-Ang 
Investors 
misjudge 
founder’s 
Human Capital  
(Gimmon) 
0 0 Mainly 1 
 (but over 50% 
success in 
judging human 
capital in this VC 
firm) 
1 & 0  
(over 50% success) 
1 0 
In-use vs. 
espoused criteria 
(Shepherd) 
1  
‘but not sure 
where the gap 
is’ 
No comment 1 1 1 
‘They won’t tell 
you what they 
failed you on’ 
1 
Investors 
availability bias 
(Zacharakis and 
Shepherd) 
1 &0  
‘success breeds 
success’ 
1  
‘sounds like life 
to me’ 
1 1 1  
‘It’s human nature 
really’ 
1 
Possible to 
improve 
evaluation? 
0  
‘problem is 
some people 
not process’ 
1  
Put head-hunter 
on the due 
diligence team. 
1  
Use HR experts 
1  
‘Don’t rely on gut 
feelings’ 
1  
‘Create a structure 
to allow investors 
to talk about it.’ 
1  
‘Probably there are 
metrics that could be 
used’ 
 
a
 Code: 1: Agree 0: Disagree 
 
 
 
 
 
 45 
Appendix 1 
Subject: Investment Criteria in High-tech New Ventures 
 
Section 1: Interviewee’s Experience:  
 
1. Name and date of interview: __________________________________________________ 
2. Firm Name:  
3. Sort: VC / Angel/ Advisor 
4. Sort: Seed / Early stage / mezzanine 
5. Industry sector: _______________ 
6. Years in investments:        
7.  Number of proposals reviewed: 
8. Number of investments made: 
9. Average amount per investments: 
Section 2: Evaluation Criteria 
1a: What, in your opinion, ultimately determines your funding decisions as an investor (specify VC or angel)? In 
other words, what criteria do you use in making your funding decisions?  
1b: Do you think your view would be a typical view in your industry? (If no: What in your opinion typically 
determines funding decisions by VCs/angels in this country?) 
2a: How easy or difficult is it for VCs/angels to judge the quality of the entrepreneur as part of the funding 
decision?  Why? 
2b: How accurate do you think VCs/angels are in evaluating entrepreneurs as part of the funding decisions? 
Why? 
3a: What do you look for in evaluating the entrepreneur in high-tech ventures? (Assume there is one clear leader, 
who is a first-time entrepreneur.) 
3b: Do you rely on third party independent data, and in what form? 
3c: Are there any criteria you used in the past that you no longer use, or criteria you use now that you haven’t 
used in the past? What are these, and why have you changed your criteria?  
3d: How typical would this be of evaluation by VCs/angels generally?  
3e: Do you know of other specific criteria that other VCs/angels use that are different to the ones you use? 
3f: If the entrepreneur had a PhD, would that make any difference to your funding decision?  
3g. If the entrepreneur was a professor, would that make any difference?  
3h Do you think the entrepreneur needs to have an in-depth understanding (tacit knowledge) of the how the 
technology works in practice or can he delegate this to others? 
3i: Have you known VCs/angels to say they make investment decisions in one particular way but actually use 
other methods? If yes: can you give me some examples? 
3j: To what extent do you always apply your investment criteria in your actual investment decisions? If not 
always: can you give me some examples? 
 
Section 3: Findings from our research on the founder's human capital and Investors' attraction to founder's 
human capital 
 
We investigated a sample of 193 high-technology start-ups in Israel, based on a homogeneous cohort of the 
Israeli Technology Incubators Programme (ITIP). Findings show that if a venture founder was a technologist by 
background, or has previous P&L responsibility (for example, as a CEO, from being self-employed, or being a 
project manager) or developed the technology that the business is based on, the probability of venture survival is 
increased. Having early sales, patents applied for, multiple fund rounds or transferring technology to other 
businesses also positively affect venture survival.  
 
We also explored whether the human capital factors that affect the performance of new high-tech ventures are 
also those that attract financial investors. Findings show that financial investors appear to be attracted by certain 
founder-based human ceremonial resources, such as academic titles, which have no effect on venture 
survivability, while ignoring certain founder-based instrumental resources, like the founder being a technologist, 
and the founder bringing their own technology to the venture, which enhance survivability.  
 
I would now like to go through each of these findings in turn, and ask you what you think of them, and if you 
can think of an explanation for our findings. At the end, I’ll tell you what researchers have suggested might be 
the reasons for our findings. 
1. Industry-related experience 
If the founder is a technologist by background, this has a positive effect on new venture survival – accepted. 
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If the founder is a technologist by background, this attracts financial investors - not supported 
2. Managerial experience 
Founder's prior P&L responsibility has positive effect on new venture survivability – marginally accepted. 
Founder's prior P&L responsibility attracts financial investors – accepted. 
3. Tacit knowledge 
If the founder brings their own original technology to the venture, this has a positive effect on venture 
survivability – accepted. 
If the founder brings their own original technology to the venture, this attracts financial investors - not supported 
4. Academic credentials 
Founder's academic titles do not affect venture survivability – accepted.   
Founder's academic titles attract financial investors – accepted. 
5. Gender  
Founder's gender does not affect venture survivability – accepted.   
Founder's gender has effect while women attract financial investors less than men - not supported.  
6. Immigration status 
Founder's immigration status has no effect on venture survivability - accepted.   
Immigrant founders attract financial investors less than non-immigrants - not supported. 
7. Age 
Founder's age does not affect venture survival – accepted. 
Founder's age has no effect on attracting financial investors - accepted.  
Findings on organizing activities and investor's attraction to organizing activities: 
8. Technology transfer to other party – positively affects venture survival, but it was not found to affect venture 
funding.  
9. Attaining early sales – positively affects both venture survival and venture funding. 
10. Number of fund raising rounds – positively affects venture survival. 
11. Number of Patent applications – positively affects both venture survival and venture funding. 
12. Findings on geographical location of the incubator where the venture was nurtured: was not found to have a 
significant impact on venture survival but was found to have a marginally significant effect on venture funding 
in favour of centrally located ventures.  
Section 4: Evaluation bias 
1. Do you agree or disagree with the proposition that VCs/angels often misjudge founders’ human capital, 
specifically the technological expertise of founders of high-tech ventures? Why? 
2. VCs’ in-use criteria vs. espouse criteria: Shepherd's (1999) research on investors' evaluation processes 
suggests that there is a gap between evaluation policies VCs use in their actual decisions and the intended criteria 
they espouse as reported by them. What do you think of this view?  
3. VCs rely on ‘gut feelings’: Zacharakis and Shepherd (2001) studied the phenomenon of VCs' heuristics and 
biases. They found evidence of an ‘availability bias’ in VCs' decision-making while VCs rely on how well the 
current decision matches past successful or failed investments. VCs, they argue, are overconfident in their 
prediction of either very high or very low likelihood of venture success. This high level of overconfidence in 
success or failure predictions may encourage the VC to make wrong funding decisions.  What do you think of 
this view? 
4. How do you think the accuracy of investors’ evaluation of founders’ human capital might be improved? 
 
 
 
 
 
